Recent developments point to a gradual weakening of the principle of impartiality, a cornerstone of the humanitarian aid model. In your view, could this trend also intensify in development cooperation, in addition to humanitarian assistance?
The context of development cooperation is evolving, with geopolitical dynamics increasingly being invoked as a justification for intervention. A growing politicisation of aid is already under way—even in countries traditionally considered more “disinterested”, such as the Nordic countries. It is important to recall the distinction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Humanitarian aid has always been grounded in the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, which are characteristic of “humanitarian” assistance, that is, assistance aimed at humanity as a whole, with the purpose of alleviating suffering in situations of disaster or conflict. Development cooperation, by contrast, has historically been driven by some form of donor interest: traditionally, national strategic considerations have justified why taxpayers’ money should be used to support the development of countries other than those of the donors.
Today, the risk is that humanitarian aid itself may lose its core principles of impartiality. It therefore does not surprise me that development cooperation is proceeding in an even more selective manner, as this has always been the case and is now simply more explicit. The motivation of self-interest has always coexisted—albeit with varying degrees of emphasis—with more “disinterested” justifications grounded in international solidarity. A recent trend has been to replace the term “cooperation” with “partnership”, in order to underline the move beyond the donor–recipient relationship, or with “promotion of national interests”, where the objective is to build consensus in political arenas that are less inclined toward international solidarity.
This applies at the European level as well, where the “Directorate-General for Development Cooperation” has been renamed the “Directorate-General for International Partnerships”. This terminological shift has been interpreted in different ways: some view partnerships as more inclusive, overcoming the distinction between “beneficiary” and “donor”, while others see them as a form of cooperation increasingly shaped by foreign policy interests. An example of this trend can be found in the latest Swedish White Paper on Development Cooperation. Sweden, a country historically perceived as “disinterested”, now explicitly states that aid will also be used as a tool to advance foreign policy objectives. In essence, national interest has always been present in development cooperation; it is simply more visible today. Moreover, in the face of increasingly tight budgetary constraints and growing needs in partner countries, there is a stronger emphasis on aid acting as a catalyst to mobilise private capital and investment.
Among the factors underlying the crisis of the multilateral development cooperation model is the spread of populism, which itself is rooted in growing inequalities reinforced by turbo-capitalist models, corrupt governments and deep globalisation, both in developing and developed countries. In your view, is there an “ideological” alternative to the progressive isolation of many states and the dismantling of multilateralism? In other words, are there alternative responses capable of fostering a new collective vision?
I do not agree with the idea that “populism” has dismantled multilateralism, not least because populism itself is extremely difficult to define. The crisis of multilateralism stems rather from a global economic crisis and from the need to rethink the functioning of multilateral institutions established after the Second World War. The premise is that globalisation has generally been a positive phenomenon for developing countries—particularly in Asia. The problem, however, is that it has also generated shocks in other developing countries that have been unable to benefit to the same extent and now struggle to find economic space. At the same time, developed countries have been affected by the growing competitiveness of emerging economies, deindustrialisation, and the disappearance of certain economic sectors, often concentrated in specific geographic areas within countries.
The core issue is therefore the failure of governments to respond adequately and to anticipate these developments. Rising inequality within countries has further fuelled widespread disillusionment with the capacity of institutions—national or supranational—to provide solutions, and has facilitated the search for simplistic or extreme answers. As the Canadian philosopher Joseph Heath has argued, populism is not so much a struggle between elites and the poor, but rather between common sense and intellectualism. We are witnessing a situation in which most people rely on gut reactions—what Daniel Kahneman would call “fast thinking”—leading to a search for simple solutions and, at times, scapegoats. The COVID-19 crisis and migration are two recent phenomena that clearly illustrate this trend. Numerous studies, for example, show that migrants have a relatively limited impact on the consumption of public services compared to the taxes they pay. Yet this evidence does not change the perceptions of those who reason emotionally and attribute the decline of their social and economic status to migrants. From questioning national governments to questioning international institutions and the usefulness of multilateral cooperation, the step is a short one.
At the same time, the Bretton Woods institutions and the multilateral system more broadly must be rethought in order to grant greater weight to developing countries within their governance structures and to respond more effectively to a profoundly transformed global economy. Technological and climate challenges, for example, require collective responses. This calls for a reform of institutional mandates and, in parallel, for the development of coalition-based approaches, such as the model launched by the French President with the Pact for Prosperity, People and the Planet (4P). These coalitions are built around shared themes that serve as unifying factors among participating countries.
The crisis of universalist systems (development aid, healthcare, and the protection of common goods more broadly) contrasts with the emergence of a new generation—Generation Z—that rejects borders, embraces non-violence, and does not experience social differences in the same way as previous generations. Could we say that the current resurgence of nationalist or sovereigntist sentiment is also linked to a form of “demography in power”?
I am not sure I have a definitive answer to this question. My generation (those born in the 1970s) experienced a period marked by modernisation, the end of the Cold War, increasing globalisation, and improvements in living standards—developments that gradually extended to developing countries as well. The necessity and value of European integration, for example, seemed self-evident and unquestionable, as did the assumption that our children would enjoy better living conditions than their parents. These certainties are now faltering—to put it mildly. Population ageing probably does not facilitate forward-looking policy choices. Take Brexit as an example: analyses of its demographic composition revealed that young people—who were overwhelmingly opposed to leaving the EU—largely did not vote. Thus, population ageing, concerns about decline, and low youth participation in electoral processes may all contribute to explaining the current situation.
Alongside the crisis of the Western development cooperation model, we are witnessing an increase in Chinese activities in developing countries. Do you believe that the vacuum left by the disappearance of USAID could be filled by China’s expanding role on the international stage?
Yes, certainly—but not only by China. Turkey, India and the Gulf countries are also playing an increasingly significant role. Over the past twenty years, we have observed profound economic transformations that have also reshaped the donor ecosystem. The emergence of new engines of global growth has led to what the OECD has described as “shifting wealth”, with the centre of economic gravity moving toward Asia. The growing wealth of these “emerging” countries has encouraged them to diversify their international engagement, with increasing involvement in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
These new actors propose new types of relationships and partnerships that combine aid, investment and trade with countries with which they may not have previously had significant economic ties. Part of the explanation for the rise and success of these actors lies in their ability to present themselves as “different” partners compared to traditional donors—placing less emphasis on human rights and good governance, imposing fewer aid conditionalities, and interfering less in the internal affairs of partner countries. They have also shown a greater capacity to adapt to the realities of developing countries. For instance, multinational firms originating in emerging economies have demonstrated a stronger ability to adapt and remain resilient in the socio-economic conditions of developing countries.
The narrative of development cooperation has long been highly “emotive”. On the one hand, institutions are increasingly hollowed out and less effective; on the other, the emotional burden of certain messages is shifted onto individual citizens, supported by media-driven fundraising mechanisms that strongly appeal to emotions. In your view, has the “emotional” approach facilitated or hindered the evolution of aid models in contexts of poverty?
It has certainly facilitated it, in the sense that—especially in the past—powerful images were used to motivate interventions, in what has been referred to as the “pornography” of development. This amounted to a form of populist approach—appealing to emotions rather than reason, but in this case in favour of solidarity rather than national interest. It proved effective, particularly in moments of catastrophe or conflict. Explaining why development cooperation matters, what its impact is, and how to generate “rational” public support for it is objectively difficult.
First, development cooperation deals with issues that are geographically and socially distant, making its impact hard to observe. Second, the problems it seeks to address are complex, and the risk of failure when tackling such challenges is high. Finally, and related to this point, the impact of cooperation depends on many factors that lie beyond the control of those implementing it. Appeals to emotion therefore serve as a shortcut to securing public support. The obvious risk, however, is the creation of a competition over who is worse off. When domestic conditions deteriorate, recourse to more egoistic reasoning or the search for scapegoats becomes more frequent, and emotional support for aid may decline. By contrast, the case for development cooperation should be grounded in arguments based on shared interests with other countries—for example, the need for collective responses to climate change. This does not imply abandoning ethical or emotional arguments but rather complementing them with more effective communication and greater education for living together.
Could you recommend a book and a film to explore these issues—and the themes you work on—in greater depth?
The book I would recommend is Nectar in a Sieve by Kamala Markandaya (Feltrinelli), which addresses resilience and what Amartya Sen would describe as “capabilities” or empowerment. I would also recommend How China Escaped the Poverty Trap by Yuen Yuen Ang, which—partly in response to the theories of Nobel laureate Daron Acemoglu—argues that there are no perfect institutions for escaping poverty, but rather that progress depends on making the best possible use of available resources and engaging in experimentation.